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flying into turbulence:
the raleigh-durham airport
expansion controversy
The Raleigh-Durham Airport Authority (RDUAA)
is in the process of expanding its facilities to
accommodate current and projected air carrier
operations. Five alternative plans have been drawn
up by consultants, only one of which is seen as
sufficient by the Airport Authority. This alternative,
known as Plan B, would send aircraft directly over
Umstead Park and a considerable number of homes
and businesses. For this reason, Plan B is opposed
by many area residents. Strenuous arguments for
and against the various alternatives have come from
all sides, yet the debate seems bogged down
because of a failure to reach a consensus on area
needs and desires and a general lack of information
on the costs and benefits of the various plans.
Is expansion necessary in the first place or is this
merely an attempt on the part of RDUAA to keep
pace with competing facilities in Greensboro and
Charlotte? Is Plan B clearly superior to the other
alternatives? The most significant conclusion is that
no one has presented the detailed information
necessary to make an intelligent choice between
these plans. However, in-depth research suggests
that an alternative other than Plan B offers a more
modest but totally adequate solution. This article
will briefly review the struggle over expansion of
Raleigh-Durham Airport and follow with a detailed
account of the benefits and drawbacks of each plan
as seen by the author.
current history of rdu airport
The Raleigh Durham Airport Authority (RDUAA)
originated in 1939 after Durham and Wake Counties
together with the cities of Durham and Raleigh
successfully petitioned the state legislature to
provide enabling legislation for a four-party aviation
facility. 1 This legislation allowed each governmental
body to be assessed one-fourth of the cost when any
bond issues were floated. It also allowed the
jurisdiction most directly affected by the airport
facility to have a say in its future growth.
By 1968, the RDUAA had documented its need for
expansion. The only question was where. Initially,
the Airport Authority endorsed a proposal known as
Plan A. This scheme called for a new 10,000 foot
runway 5000 feet southeast of the existing runway
(#5-23) with both runways operating simultaneous-
ly. A new terminal would be located between the two
runways, and primary access would be from N.C. 54.
A controversy ensued, however, when it was learned
that the plan would involve an exchange of 350 acres
of airport land for 264 acres from Umstead State
Park. Local attention focused on this when a
newspaper ran a Sunday feature article on a North
Carolina State University scientist conducting
habitat studies of gray squirrels in that area. The
expansion plan would end the research effort when
the Park land was traded. The prospect of a land
exchange incensed many people, spurring the in-
itiation of a group, Citizens to Save Umstead Park,
specifically organized to oppose the Authority's
plan. Their claim was that Plan A would require
cutting easements on 230 acres of the Park's land
with other rights for low level flyovers given on an
additional 620 acres. 2 Noise pollution was alleged to
affect 1100 of the Park's 5200 acres. The RDUAA
justified the plan as its least cost proposal.
The ultimate test for Plan A came in a $20 million
bond vote on November 5, 1968. Its failure to pass
was attributed to a possible tax increase, the
RDUAA/Umstead Park land exchange and a lack of
data supporting the Airport's expansion plans. 3
After modifying Plan A, the RDUAA again tried to
arrange a land exchange with Umstead Park in
1970. 4 But the North Carolina State Board of Con-
servation and Development, along with the National
Park Service, refused, 5 forcing the reconsideration
of priorities. The RDUAA developed 11 alternate
schemes with the aid of a consultant, J. E. Greiner,
and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
Each of these were discussed by all parties men-
tioned above. Four were decided to be worthy of
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Air traffic controllers monitor flights at Raleigh-
Durham Airport
Courtesy of Raleigh News and Observer.
more in depth study. They were coined Plan B, Plan
C.and PlanC-1. Plan A was retained for comparative
purposes only. Plan D, which stretched the existing
runway to 10,000 feet was also developed. A subse-
quent proposal, C-2, has now emerged, and is being
endorsed by the airlines through a trade organiza-
tion, the Air Transport Association of America
(ATA).
The Airport Authority has endorsed Plan B and
successfully petitioned the Wake County Board of
Commissioners to rezone 2000 acres in Wake Coun-
ty in anticipation of the plan's approval. 6 A public
hearing scheduled for November, 1973, drew little
public response. Shortly thereafter, the FAA
offerred tentative approval following further
documentation based on the environmental impact
assessment due in 1974. These findings were
presented with other documents (Physical Develop-
ment Plan and Financial Report) at a public hearing
in December, 1974. A revised impact statement is
past due but is still to be released. Although some
objections were raised -these will be examined later
in detail - the RDUAA felt confident enough to send
all the necessary documents on to Washington,
urging the FAA's prompt approval of Plan B.
expansion requirements
The Raleigh-Durham Airport is responsibleforthe
aviation needs of the Research Triangle Region,
which includes the metropolitan areas of Raleigh,
Durham, and Chapel Hill. In the period from 1950-
1970, Raleigh's population increased 84% while
Durham's grew by 44%. 7 As a regional airport, this
facility's expansion is an attempt to keep pace with
population growth in order to preserve the
economic vitality of the area. The underlying
premise here is that added population means in-
creased airport use.
Market studies prepared by two consultants in
1970 and 1972 showed that passenger facilities at
RDU were inadequate and that demand for long-
haul (1500 miles) non-stop carrier service was
increasing. 8 In the period from 1966-1972, enplaned
passengers increased by 107% and enplaned cargo
tonnage increased by 178%. 9 Enplaned passengers
are expected to rise from 712,300 in 1975 to 2,287,-
600 by 1 995. 10 Total airport operations (landings and
takeoffs) will increase from 192,300 in 1975 to
450,000 by 1995." One problem arising from this
increase is that the existing terminal cannot accom-
modate more passengers and existing runways
cannot meet the loads presented by heavier aircraft
soon to be operating from the airport. In fact, the
principal instrument runway will need to be rebuilt in
order to handle higher traffic volumes and heavier
weight aircraft. Further, increased passenger
volumes can only be accommodated through con-
struction of a new terminal. A second problem arises
from the fact that the airport has only one fully
instrumented runway. Should this runway require
major repairs, the entire facility would be shutdown.
A crash would create the same result. In either case,
"The Airport Authority has only
provided a limited amount of data on
the alternatives it rejected, whereas
complete documentation was offered
for the alternatives they selected."
all passenger traffic would have to be rerouted to
Greensboro where passengers would take a bus to
Raleigh-Durham. (In each of the alternatives a back-
up runway is provided to solve this difficulty.)
criteria
The criteria adopted as a means of evaluating the
alternatives agreed upon by the RDUAA and the
FAA are: amount and cost of land to be acquired,
operational and safety feasibility of the facilities,
development costs, environmental impacts, land
use compatibility, and access on and off the air-
port. 12
Unfortunately, a proper evaluation of the alter-
natives has been made difficult due to a lack of
information. The Airport Authority has only provid-
ed a limited amount of data on the alternatives it
rejected, whereas complete documentation was
offered for the alternative they selected. Operational
and safety feasibility evaluations were done only for
one scheme since the others embodied the same
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requirements as specified by the FAA. Cost factors
considering site preparation, drainage, relocations,
and airfield pavements were developed in detailed
financial estimates only for the alternatives deemed
feasible by the Airport Authority.
Environmental criteria consisted of community
noise, air pollution, water pollution (including soil
erosion), natural phenomena characteristic of each
area, and noise to Umstead Park. Sewage and
industrial wastes for all comparisons were found
"The question of reducing general
aviation operations out of Raleigh-
Durham is important since these
flights account for over half of the
projected growth through 1995."
minimal and not considered in detail. Potential land
use conflicts were evaluated with respect to impacts
on Umstead State Park and the Research Triangle
Park. Secondary consideration was given to the
number of homes and institutions that might be
affected by the expansion.
Criticisms about the airport's measurement of
noise contours and the actual cost savings among
the alternatives are being considered in the final
draft of the environmental impact statement.
Although due in October, 1975, this report was
postponed to January, 1976. At this time, the impact
statement still has not been released.
alternatives
The consultant preparing the Airport Master Plan
developed three alternatives to accommodate the
airport's projected expansion. These include (1) the
removal of air carrier service from the existing site to
an unspecified new location, (2) the removal of some
or all of the general aviation operations so no
additional runways would be required, and (3) the
development of the existing site to its maximum
potential by the addition of new runways and other
facilities as they are required. 13 A search for new air
carrier sites was conducted. However, the nearest
suitable location was found to be 40 miles from the
present site, outside the jurisdiction of the RDUAA.
Subsequent discussions with the FAA about this site
concluded that its distance from the present facility
would unduly alter the air trade of the area because
of its inconvenience, and the investment loss in-
curred in making such a move would be unaccep-
table. 14 The removal of general aviation (non-
commercial) operations was discussed and found to
be possible.
The question of reducing the general aviation
operations out of Raleigh-Durham is important
since these flights account for over half of the
projected growth through 1995 (see the following
section, Question 6). However, the consultant felt it
was "inappropriate" to make any proposals with
regard to this as North Carolina is presently working
on recommendations for general aviation facilities
for the entire state. Such action eliminated all but the
last alternative - developing the present site to its
maximum potential. As noted previously, this
resulted in 12 scheme layouts, of which three were
suggested by the FAA, two by RDUAA, six by the
consultant, and one by the airlines. The five accep-
table plans plus the now defunct Plan A appear in
Figure 1.
Fig. 1
PLAN A: Runway 5R-23L, the existing 7500-
foot runway, would be rebuilt. A new
10,000-foot runway, 5L-23R, would
be built 5000 feet southeast of the
existing 7500-foot runway. Runway
14-32 would be lengthened from
4500 feet to 6500 feet. (This is the
plan that was rejected in 1968
because it required a land exchange
with Umstead Park.)
PLAN B: The existing 7500-foot runway
would be rebuilt. Existing runway
32R-14L would be lengthened to
6500 feet. A new 10,000-foot runway,
32L-14R, would be constructed.
New terminal facilities would be re-
quired. (This is the plan supported
by the RDUAA.)
PLAN C: A new 10,000-foot runway, 5L-23R,
would be developed 5000 feet
northwest and parallel to runway 5-
23. Runway 5R-23L, 7500 feet, would
be rebuilt. Runway 32R-14L would
be lengthened to 6500 feet. Terminal
facilities would be similar to the ones
above. This alternative requires the
most fill, would remove the greatest
amount of vegetation, has the
greatest erosion hazard, and incurs
the greatest cost. Runway layouts
would expose more residents to
noise levels of 30 NEF than any other
plan.
PLAN C-1 Runway 5R-23L would be the same
as in Plan C. Runway 5L-23R of
10,000 feet would be re-oriented
slightly from C in orderto reduce the
land-fill requirements. This layout
would lengthen the glide approach
paths which, in turn, would require
the airport to buy more land, in-
cluding added industrial and
residential property, one motel, and
two cemetaries.
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Map showing layout of existing runway and alternatives B, C, and C-2.
PLAN C-2: Runway 5R-23L would be rebuilt
and lengthened 750 feet for a new
length of 8,250 feet. A new runway
designed to serve general aviation
(private) operations would be con-
structed at a length of 6000 feet. This
runway, 5L-23R, would be 1000 feet
closer to 5R-23L than in C. Although
it could serve as a backup runway,
future expansion would be limited.
(This plan is supported by the air-
lines.)
PLAN D: Runway 5-23 would be rebuilt and a
2500-foot addition would be made to
give it a 10,000-foot length. This is
the do-nothing alternative as it
represents the minimum action re-
quired to meet FAA safety re-
quirements. Such activity work
would require the airport to be clos-
ed for an indefinite period of time.
However, even the rebuilding would
not allow the airport to service the
predicted demand increases.
Only total project costs are available for the
alternatives. Detailed cost figures are provided only
for Plan B. For this reason, detailed estimation of
costs for the other alternatives is not possible. No
figures for various runway configurations men-
tioned in the above plans are given. Accepting this
limitation, speculation about benefits and costs for
the other alternatives is the only method left for
comparison.
effects of the alternative plans
The lack of precise information for the schemes
not supported by RDUAA make it difficult to analyze
and compare the alternatives. The Master Plan
presented to various groups and displayed at public
hearings contained detailed estimates for Plan B
alone. Research by the author eventually resulted in
more detailed figures. These findings are outlined
below.
Amount/Cost of Land to be Acquired: No costs are
provided except for Plan B. This is critical since the
land costs vary depending on where and from whom
it is purchased. However, the amount purchased
under each alternative is listed, and a rough com-
parison of costs might be deduced from this.
Operational and Safety Feasibility: This criterion
provides no basis of comparison since all alter-
natives had to meet FAA specified minimum re-
quirements.
Development Costs: As indicated, there are no
detailed cost figures except for Plan B. Apparently
RDUAA made these calculations although they are
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not included in the Master Plan. One can assume
that the minimum cost of each alternative's terminal
facilities is the same. Table 1 presents the construc-
tion and variable costs associated with each alter-
native (land required, fill, homes displaced, etc.).
Some question might be raised about the
preceeding cost figures. A more exact estimate
appears in the following (Table 2) which examines
each component of the various alternatives. Note
that all plans are cheaper except B. The new table
indicates C-2 could cost up to $1 7,000,000 less than
the figure given to the Raleigh News and Observer.
Environmental Impacts: Air pollution estimates
for 1980 indicate no real advantage for any one
alternative although all fall below the 1975 levels due
to expected future restrictions on aircraft engines.
Likewise, estimates for 1995 again reveal no actual
advantage for any alternative.
With design controls taken into account, the impact
of the various alternatives on local water quality is
also seen as minimal. All projects would provide
erosion controls and be designed to minimize
petroleum waste and stormwater runoff. Costs were
not given for the control systems under each
alternative, thus no real advantage is apparent for
any plan.' 5 It should be pointed out, however, that
Plan C-2's costs would be $5,000,000 greater than
the others because its 6000 foot runway would cause
the airport sewage treatment plant to be relocated.
Noise measurements for the various alternatives
were based on what is known as the Noise Exposure
Forecast (NEF) system. NEF levels are calculated
from aircraft noise expressed in EPNdb (effective
perceived noise measured in decibels) togetherwith
the number of operations occurring during daytime
and night-time periods.' 6
The FAA has published guidelines indicating
land-use activities which are compatible with the
various NEF levels. Within the NEF 30-40 range,
activities where uninterrupted communication is
essential should consider sound in design. General-
ly, residential development is not considered a
suitable use, although multi-family developments
where sound control features have been incor-
porated might be considered. Open-air activities
and outdoor living will be "affected" by aircraft
sound. The construction of auditoriums, schools,
churches, hospitals, and theaters is not
recommended in this zone.
At or above the NEF 40 range, FAA guidelines urge
that land be reserved for activities that can tolerate a
high level of sound exposure such as some
agricultural, industrial, and commercial uses. No
residential developments of any type are
recommended. Sound sensitive activities such as
schools, offices hospitals, churches, and the like
should not be constructed in this area if at all
possible.
Table 1
COST OVERVIEW AND REQUIREMENTS
(a)
(b)
$ Cost (1973) Environmental Consequences
X 106
build ngs (all types)
Land in fill requirements selective cHearing exposed to NEF 40 or
acres in cubic yards required i i acres higher contours
PLAN A 105 1595 11,006,000 309 not given
PLAN B 100 1929 17,073,000 333 62
PLAN C 117 1923 23,022,924 294 11
PLAN C-1 120 2245 15,483,694 488 11
PLAN C-2* 110 760 13,367,100 00
PLAN D 75 545 3,280,000 36 00
(a) Cost figures were taken from a Raleigh News and Obsen/erarticle dated 2/20/76. There is some question as to whether
these numbers represent the total cost or just the construction cost. A telephone conversation with the newspaper
reporter, Rick Nichols, and the Airport Director, Henry Boyd (4/20/76), failed to clarify this. Costs include each
environmental consequence listed except the NEF contours.
(b) Air pollution was minimal for each alternative and not included (see RDU Airport Master Plan. Environmental Impact
Assessment Report, p. 67, pp. 99-104). Stormwater runoff values are also minimal and not listed (same as above, p. 92).
'Except for cost, all figures are taken from the Greiner Engineering Sciences' report, Analysis for the FAA of a Runway
Orientation Scheme Proposed by the ATA, May, 1975.
NOTE: Unless otherwise documented, all figures appear in the Raleigh-Durham Airport Master Plan. Environmental
Impact Assessment Report.
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Table 3 gives project alternatives and the number
of residences or institutions that are within NEF 30-
40 contour range. The effect of a given NEF level on
surrounding land has been previously noted.
These measurements indicate that while Plan B
subjects fewer residences to a combined NEF 30-40
contour, it subjects more to the higher noise level
than the four other alternatives combined. There is a
significant increase in noise between these two
contours since the NEF scale is logarithmic. In fact,
the NEF chart suggest that no residential construc-
tion be allowed in an area exposed to more than 30
NEF. The Master Plan does not mention damage
payments due to noise, but it would seem to be
RDUAA's responsibility to offer some compensation
to these homeowners if Plan Bis approved. Itshould
be noted that Plan C-2 was not submitted in time to
be considered in the Environmental Impact Assess-
ment Report. However, given its similar but smaller
scale relative to Plan D, smaller NEF contours could
be expected.
Land Use Compatibility: The principle measure-
ment used in determining land-use compatibility
was the number of homes and/or institutions that
Table 2
COSTS DERIVED USING
COMPONENT ESTIMATION*
(1973 Million Dollars)
Plan A Plan B Plan C Plan C-1 Plan C-2 Plan D
Embankment 14 22 29 19.7 17 4.2
Airfield 22 22 22 22 13 10
Land 3.5 4 5 6 2 1.5
Roads 2 4 4 4 2 2
Drainage
Structure/
Miscellaneous
Costs 1 5
Terminal 30.2 30.2 30.2 30.2 30.2 30.2
Power Line
Relocation 2 2
Sub total 71.7 83.2 92.2 83.9 69.2 47.9
Contingencies,
Engineering,
Administration 15.8 18.3 20.3 18.5 15.2 10.5
TOTAL 87.5 101.5 112.5 102.4 84.4 58.4
'These are the author's estimates as derived from the RDU Airport Master Plan and the Greiner Engineering Sciences'
Analysis for the FAA of a Runway Orientation Scheme Proposed by the ATA.
(1) The cost here is $1.27/cubic yard of fill versus .75/cubic yard used in earlier estimated.
(2) Costs assumed equal except for C-2 and D which have less extensive runways.
(3) All schemes have the same terminal requirements.
(4) Allows for a 22% underestimate of project costs.
(5) Does not include possible relocation of eight industries.
(6) Does not include cost noted in (5) and two taxiways @ $1,000,000 each.
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would have to be acquired by RDUAA in order to
implement each alternative plan. These figures are
summarized in Table 4."
PLAN
Table 4
RESIDENCES BUSINESSES CHURCHES
A 2
B 18 2
C 13 7
C-1 47 8 1
C-2 not given not given not given
D
Airport Access: No figures for road relocation
exist except for those previously noted. Total road
relocation and access costs for B in 1973 dollars are
$5,065,340.'° Although the roads to be relocated or
improved for each alternative are developed, no
specific costs are presented except for Plans Band
C-2.
questions on the airport plan
Following is a series of questions addressing the
most serious shortcomings of RDUAA's support for
Plan B.
Are the NEF forecasts accurate? It appears that
they are technically correct, although the contours
for Plan B are distorted. Forecasts show takeoffs
occurring on the 10,000 foot runway away from
Umstead Park (toward Durham). Landings would
take place from the opposite direction bringing
aircraft in over Umstead Park. Under normal con-
ditions greater noise levels occur on takeoff than on
landing. However, if these landing patterns were
reversed, the Park area would be subjected to
substantially higher noise levels. It is very difficult to
justify the expense of the 10,000 foot runway if
planes are only allowed to takeoff and land in
specified directions. It appears more likely that no
such restriction would be imposed with subsequent-
ly higher NEF levels occurring over the Park.
Another possible bias is found in the NEF contour
measurement itself. Under the NEF system, noise
levels are arrived at by averaging the highest peak
frequencies recorded during both a day and night
period, a practical approach for most large airports
where flights occur around the clock. At Raleigh-
Durham, however, most of the flights occur only
during daylight hours. Thus, when the lower night-
time figures are averaged with the daylight
operations, a much lower noise contour is indicated
than would appear under other measurement
systems. Considering the fact that those facilities
most seriously affected by the proposed expansion
(Research Triangle Park and Umstead State Park)
operate only during the day, the NEF contour
measurement system does not give an accurate
indication of the annoyance one is likely to ex-
perience.
CO
O
t>
c
-C
r
3
o
O
Existing terminal facilities at RDU cannot handle the
expected increase in passenger use
Table 3
PLAN
A
B'
9
C 20
C-1 2 '
C-2
D 22
NEF 30
not given
44 homes, 1 church
208 homes, 2 churches
228 homes, 2 churches
not given
258 homes, 2 churches
NEF 40
not given
61 homes, 1 church
11 homes
11 homes
not given
no exposure
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Why are no projects costs given for the alter-
natives? This appears to be in keeping with FAA
policy which only requires cost documentation for
the endorsed plan. No specific statement explaining
this policy was found. However, the policy for
developing environmental impact statements allows
only detailed evaluation for the proposed plan. 23
Supposedly, time and cost factors would preclude
extensive documentation for each alternative,
although this is what is required for accurate and
objective judgments.
Did the public hearing afford the opportunity for
adequate public input? Apparently, the Airport
Authority revealed very little about the expansion
schemes except Plan B. As evidenced by the sample
survey, the Northwest Community Task Force felt
there was inadequate citizen input due to a lack of
knowledge about the hearings. 24 Excessive and
incomplete data were also cited as contributing to
the frustration and confusion of trying to interpret
the airport's Master Plan. 25 It was noted that the local
planning agencies and public libraries given data by
RDUAA did not have a copy of the Financial Plan
which is crucial in understanding the overall
proposal. Citizens felt the Airport Authority merely
went through the motions of conducting a public
hearing, "complying with the form of public hearing
requirements set out in FAA regulations - on a plan
to which the Authority was already committed." 26 In
addition, the chairman of the hearing only allowed
each speaker five minutes, and even then the
remarks had to be limited to Plan B alone. 27
Are there inherent biases in the Environmental
Impact Statement (the same firm that prepared the
physical plan recommending Plan B was employed
to examine its environmental impact)? This
possibility does exist and cannot be excluded. It
appears very unlikely that the same firm recommen-
ding a specific plan would find fault with it in a
subsequent report. Although the FAA has no
guidelines which prevent this from happening, it is
obvious that the final statement would appear more
valid if a disinterested third party were to carry out
the evaluation.
How much consideration was given to relocating
the general aviation sector to another facility? This
course of action was acknowleged by the Airport
Authority, but it does not appear to have been given
much serious thought. In fact, RDUAA played down
the role of general aviation in future airport
forecasts. For example, consider future airport
operations (Table 5). 29
The present facilities are said to be operating at
maximum capacity now, which is 192,300
operations/yr. Looking at the last column below
would seem to indicate the general aviation sector
constitutes a large majority of the airport's opera-
tion. In fact, if the general aviation portion of the
airport's operations could be completely eliminated,
there would be no need for any new runways.
"... (I)t is obvious that the final
(environmental impact) statement
would appear more valid if a dis-
interested third party were to carry
out the evaluation"
Does Plan C-2 offer any cost advantages over Plan
B? It appears that Plan C-2 could be up to $17,000,-
000 cheaper than B. Its shorter runways provide
adequate and efficient service for both commercial
and private aircraft. This means less maintenance,
land, and land fill costs than B. Safety is also
improved by placing general aviation operations on
one runway and commercial flights on another. It
should be mentioned that RDUAA has developed a
modified Plan B which incorporates the same
features presented by C-2. Such a plan would give B
lower costs. 30 However, the FAA has evaluated both
of these modified plans and feels neither represents
good planning. 3 '
What is the justification for the 10,000 foot runway
required in the other alternatives, and can C-2's
shorter (8,250 foot) length provide adequate ser-
Table 5
YEAR
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
TOTAL
AIR GENERAL without general
CARRIER AVIATION MILITARY aviation
OPERATIONS OPERATIONS OPERATIONS TOTAL operations
40,200 138,100 14,000 192,300 54,200
47,400 189,700 14,000 251,100 61,400
55,000 254,200 14,000 323,200 69,000
65,800 327,100 14,000 406,900 79,000
70,800 365,200 14,000 450,000 84,800
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The need for expanded facilities at RDU is largely
the result of increasing general aviation activities
Courtesy of Raleigh News and Observer.
Wee? Originally, the 10,000 foot runway was justified
by consultants who described the need as based on
future enplanement forecasts. RDU was projected to
have substantial increases in long distance flights to
the Midwest and West coast. These flights would
require longer and stronger runways of up to 10,000
feet in order to compensate for heavier aircraft
weights due to added fuel requirements. It now
appears that C-2's length would offer more than
adequate service since the new generation of wide-
bodied jets require less takeoff distance than ex-
isting models. The Air Transport Association of
America (ATA) which supports C-2, has argued that
RDUAA is trying to cope with general aviation
increases by developing a top of the line runway for
long-haul carriers. The Association further states
that commercial flights are not expected to increase
significantly in the next 25 years into RDU and that
general aviation operations have more modest re-
quirements.
Table 5 clearly shows that if general aviation
operations were removed from the main runway (as
C-2 suggests), the existing facility would be ade-
quate for the period through 1995. Although ATA
acknowledges that the main runway would have to
rebuilt and lengthened, it makes a good argument
for eliminating B's 10,000 foot strip. By forcing
private planes onto a new 6500 foot runway, C-2
would eliminate congestion and promote safety
simultaneously. On the other hand, B overbuilds for
the projected demand by providing a 10,000 foot
runway which is unnecessarily long, and two secon-
dary runways of 7500 and 6500 feet which (when
combined) are excessive for the demands presented
by the general aviation sector.
RDUAA has accepted the idea that the best way to
maximize the development of the present site is to
provide a 10,000 foot runway for the occassional
(only several times a year) West Coast or European
charter flight. As ATA noted, these are the only
flights that would require such a long runway, and all
other commercial flights could be accommodated
on the shorter and less costly main runway of C-2. It
seems difficult to believe that B's higher cost can be
justified simply by RDUAA's desire to offer a more
complete but seldom used service.
What type of NEF contours does C-2 have? The
contours would be similar to Plan D.32 NEF contours
30 and 40 would be extended slightly on the
southwestern end of runway 5R-23L due to the 750
foot addition. More importantly, runway 5L-23R
would be shortened from C's 1 0,000 feet to 6000 feet,
and would be moved closer to 5R-23L by 1000 feet.
Both of these factors would substantially reduce the
noise produced. In addition, since runway 5L-23R
would only be used for general aviation operations,
one could expect the noise levels above the 30 NEF
range would not be generated.
Although the Airport Authority suggests that C-2
would have twice the noise impact of B, it gives no
indication what NEF levels would be experienced. It
should be noted that since C-2 is siimlar to D in its
NEF contours, no home or business would ex-
perience the very loud 40 NEF level generated by
Plan B.
How accurate are the total cost figures? The new
1973 construction cost figure for Plan B was $101,-
000,000. Assuming an inflation rate of 8%/year for
each year since then, Plan B would now cost
approximately $126,000,000. The accuracy of the
other figures is difficult to ascertain given variable
land and fill costs which are not documented in the
Master Plan. There is also the problem of social
costs which have not been documented. How does
one transform the higher noise levels of S into
monetary losses? Is there some method for es-
timating the number and cost of law suits which
might be forthcoming from property owners (public
and private)? These considerations were not made
by RDUAA and can only be estimated in relative
terms.
conclusions
A few conclusions can summarize the findings of
this article:
1. The RDUAA has not maintained close contact
with the public. Until it does so, it must expect
continued conflicts.
2. The Airport Authority should adopt an attitude
that appears more open and willing to accept
criticisms and suggestions. A refusal to do so will
result in another failure like the one in 1968.
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3. The above might best be achieved by allowing
some of the community groups to participate
more directly in airport plans and decisions.
4. The FAA needs to be urged to alter its public
hearing policy so as not to present a closed mind
to various alternatives. The existing format allows
the Airport Authority to make its choice in the
absence of citizen input.
5. FAA guidelines should be developed which pre-
vent one consultant from preparing more than
one part of an airport master plan. This could help
eliminate possible conflicts of interest.
6. The NEF contour approach to noise measure-
ment does not seem particularly suited to the case
at hand. An average of daytime and nighttime
noise levels tends to result in a value which
underestimates actual noise levels during the
most critical part of RDUAA's operational activity
(daytime). Such an underestimate could have
serious consequences for the Research Triangle
Park as well as Umstead State Park.
7. Detailed financial estimates should be required
for each alternative rather than only for the one
the Airport Authority is endorsing. Comparisons
are difficult and almost impossible without this
information. This requirement should be
developed regardless of the FAA's policy.
8. Sufficient information has not been provided to
determine which alternative is best. No action
should be taken until this information becomes
available. It does appear that Plan B, which is
being offered as the 'best' alternative by RDUAA,
would tend to lose any advantages it might now
have when more complete data is available.
Using the data that is available suggests that C-2
might be a 'better' alternative than B for several
reasons. The cost section of the paper noted that
although Plan B is being called the least-cost
alternative, Plan C-2 is clearly less expensive. The
higher noise levels associated with B have been
noted. The question of runway lengths seem to
imply that C-2's shorter, cheaper, and totally ade-
quate runway is to be preferred to B's more costly
and noisy 10,000 foot structure. Similarly, the 6000
foot general aviation runway offered by C-2 appears
to present an added safety feature in separating
commercial and private aircraft. Whether or not this
runway could serve as a back-up for the main
commercial strip was not answered.
A basic policy question appears to be the real
issue. Does the Raleigh-Durham Airport need a
facility which would seldom be used with respect to
its designed potential (Plan B), or is a more modest,
but totally adequate alternative (Plan C-2) the
answer? Although complete documentation is lack-
ing, the author's research suggests that C-2 offers
the best solution at this time.
The conflict which has developed over the alter-
nate to be selected seems to be tied to RDUAA's
insistence on supporting Plan B. Notes from the
public hearings have suggested that Plan B was
more or less selected prior to these meetings.
Subsequent papers and reports have attempted to
discredit the other alternatives and embellish B.
Such a policy seems destined for more conflict, and
the final result can only be a voter rejection of any
referendum designed to help implement Plan B.
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